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Tax Psychology and the Timing of Charitable-Giving Deadlines
Abstract
This brief discusses the timing of the charitable-giving tax deduction deadline, evaluated in light of recent
evidence from the behavioral public finance literature. We discuss how tax salience, inattention, and aversion
to taxes interact with different possible deadlines. We present several arguments in favor of moving the
charitable-giving deadline to tax day.
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This brief discusses the timing of the charitable-giving tax deduction deadline, evaluated 
in light of recent evidence from the behavioral public finance literature. We discuss how 
tax salience, inattention, and aversion to taxes interact with different possible 
deadlines. We present several arguments in favor of moving the charitable-giving 
deadline to tax day. 
Background of the Policy Decision 
Incentivizing and rewarding donations to charitable organizations is a commonly pursued policy goal. To 
this end, charitable donations receive favored treatment in the federal tax code. Tax filers may claim 
their charitable giving as an itemized deduction, reducing taxable income and thus taxes paid.  
Under the current system, charitable-giving tax accounting aligns with the calendar year. A tax filer 
sitting down in March 2016 to complete a 2015 tax return would need to document charitable giving 
activities between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2015. In this brief, we consider the merits of a 
modification of this deadline permitting tax filers to deduct any charitable donations made prior to the 
tax filing deadline (typically April 15 of the following year). Under this policy, if a tax filer donated to 
charity in March 2016, he or she could immediately claim the deduction when filing a 2015 tax return.1 
This alternative deadline has been examined in past research and policy writing (Steuerle and Sullivan 
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1995; Steuerle 2013)2 and was included in the America Gives More Act of 2014, which passed the US 
House of Representatives in July of 2014. 
How might these different deadlines influence people’s motivation for charitable giving? In this 
brief, we approach this question based on insights from the behavioral public finance literature. We 
focus on three arguments:  
 If people are present-focused, they will be most motivated by tax incentives when these 
incentives can be claimed very quickly after a donation. 
 If incentives administered through the income tax are normally confusing or not fully salient, 
then the increased attention to tax rules that occurs before the April 15 deadline provides a 
window where tax incentives have more influence on behavior than usual. 
 The interaction between tax aversion and tax salience would similarly advantage the April 15 
deadline. 
Psychological Influences of Tax Deadline Response 
Present-focused Behavior 
Under the current system, tax benefits from charitable donations made between January 1 and April 15 
are claimed more than a year after the initial donation. Under the alternative deadline, tax benefits from 
these donations could be claimed nearly immediately, depending on the date the donor chose to file. 
Most economic models incorporate time discounting and thus would predict the incentive to be valued 
higher by donors under the alternative deadline.  
While neoclassical and behavioral economists would both agree that rewarding an action sooner 
increases incentive, they would likely disagree about the size of the effect. For a fully rational donor, 
with time-consistent preferences and a discount rate in line with that provided by financial markets, the 
effect should be small. However, a large body of work suggests that people are present-focused 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002) and discount future costs or rewards significantly 
more than market interest rates would predict. We believe that, for charitable-giving decisions made 
near April 15, the prospect of a deduction from the taxpayer’s soon-to-be-filed return is sufficiently 
imminent to avoid the heavy discounting of more distant future states. Under this assumption, people’s 
tendency to be present-focused implies that the alternative deadline would provide greater motivation 
for charitable donations. 
Before advancing our next two arguments, we first briefly summarize the relevant literature on tax 
salience and tax aversion. We then discuss how this psychology interacts with the deadlines considered 
and the present-focus discussed above. 
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Tax Salience and Attention 
When tax systems are complex, some features may not be fully understood. Some of the most influential 
work on this topic has demonstrated that the lack of visibility of sales taxes meaningfully influences 
demand for products (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009) and that reduced visibility of road-use tax 
induced by the adoption of E-ZPass reduced its incentive effect on road use (Finkelstein 2009). Other 
recent work has demonstrated that similar mechanisms apply to income tax incentives. Miller and 
Mumford (2015) examine a change to the Child and Dependent Care Credit; this change affected the 
direct, visible value that could be claimed for this credit, but also interacted with the Child Tax Credit in 
a nonsalient but offsetting manner. They demonstrate that taxpayer response was most consistent with 
reaction to the salient direct incentives of the tax and with complete ignorance of the arguably 
nonsalient interactions with other provisions of the tax code. Thus, while the tax salience literature has 
often focused on commodity taxation, its core findings appear to apply to tax incentives administered 
through the income tax as well. 
If taxpayers do not fully understand or attend to the taxes they face, how do they make tax-relevant 
decisions? Beyond the option of simply underreacting to the given tax incentives, existing evidence 
suggests two additional channels in play: the use of simplifying heuristics or “rules of thumb” and 
directed information search at targeted times of the year. 
Simplifying heuristics. In an influential paper, Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) discuss several potential 
heuristics that might influence decisionmakers facing a convex pricing schedule (like the income tax). 
One heuristic is a substitution of the average tax rate 𝜏𝐴𝑉𝐺  with the marginal tax rate 𝜏𝑀𝐴𝑅. Since 
average rates are always lower than marginal rates in a progressive tax schedule like the federal income 
tax, the use of heuristics such as these would result in underreaction to incentives that reduce taxable 
income.3 A taxpayer using this heuristic would mistakenly think a dollar donated to charity yields $𝜏𝐴𝑉𝐺  
in tax incentives when in fact it yields $𝜏𝑀𝐴𝑅. Evidence that taxpayers are subject to misunderstandings 
of this sort has been documented in simplified laboratory settings (de Bartolome 1995), in labor supply 
responses following the loss of Child Tax Credit (Feldman, Katuscak, and Kawano 2016), and in direct 
survey elicitations of taxpayers’ perceptions of their tax schedules (Rees-Jones and Taubinsky 2016). To 
the extent that this type of misunderstanding is present when considering tax incentives for charitable 
giving, it will lead to less donation due to the underestimate of the financial incentives in place. 
Directed information search. Perhaps the best available data on the timing of taxpayer information 
search behavior comes from Hoopes, Reck, and Slemrod (2015). In this paper, the authors analyze the 
patterns of information search for capital gains–related tax information over the course of the year. As 
figure 1 shows, the authors find that across several measures—including Google and Wikipedia search 
volume as well as IRS call line statistics—taxpayer information search behavior is somewhat responsive 
to events that increase the information’s value and is extremely responsive to impending tax deadlines. 
Similar results on search behavior have been confirmed in Benzarti (2015). If taxpayers are generally 
inattentive or uninformed except in the brief windows where they actively invest in tax understanding, 
these results suggest that January 1–April 15 is a key window in which underresponse to tax incentives 
might be avoided.  
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FIGURE 1 
Seasonal Patterns of Tax Information Search 
 
Source: Hoopes, Reck, and Slemrod (2015), figure 2. 
Notes: This figure presents the estimated yearly seasonal patterns of taxpayer information search behavior for three sources: 
Google search, Wikipedia search, and IRS help line calls. All measures show some responsivity to exogenous and annual increases 
in the value of information, and especially large spikes in search behavior in the immediate lead-up to tax day.   
Aversion to Tax Payments 
Recent literature has documented a significant psychological aversion to tax payments. A series of 
experiments presented in Sussman and Olivola (2011) finds that taxes are more aversive to people than 
similar or larger alternatively labeled costs. Similar results have been confirmed in experimental labor 
supply settings (Kessler and Norton, forthcoming). This general phenomenon is referred to as tax 
aversion. To the extent that giving to charity is an alternative, less aversive cost that allows one to 
bypass tax payments, this is a potentially fruitful psychological response to queue when optimizing 
incentives for giving.  
Beyond pure dislike of paying taxes, recent work has also documented significant asymmetries in 
taxpayers’ treatment of tax payments relative to tax refunds. Rees-Jones (2014) and Engström et al. 
(2015) develop and test a theory of loss-averse tax avoidance and evasion activities and find strong 
evidence that taxpayers view a marginal avoided-or-evaded dollar as “more valuable” when it reduces a 
tax payment as opposed to increasing a tax refund. This apparent aversion to out-of-pocket payments to 
the IRS could motivate the pursuit of tax-advantaged behaviors. Under the current system, this 
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motivation could go wasted: a tax filer learning of a liability in March cannot reduce the tax bill through 
charitable giving. If the deadline were extended to April 15, that tax filer could immediately reduce an 
aversive tax bill with a charitable donation. We believe this option would appeal to many. 
Implications of Tax Salience and Tax Aversion 
The psychologies of tax salience and tax aversion offer two additional reasons why changing the 
charitable-giving deadline to tax day presents opportunities to strengthen the incentive effect of the 
charitable-giving deduction.  
First, extending the deadline allows taxpayers to make donations for near-immediate tax rewards at 
a time when tax rules are unusually salient and well understood. When assessing their annual tax in the 
course of completing their tax return, many taxpayers will find opportunities to reduce aversive tax 
especially desirable. An April 15 deadline would grant taxpayers the opportunity to immediately reduce 
those payments through a charitable donation. Existing research on tax salience leads us to believe that 
the psychological forces associated with these issues would enhance the tax-motivated pursuit of 
charitable giving. 
Second, we believe changing the deadline would give professional tax preparers a more active role 
in motivating charitable giving. A significant percentage of all tax returns are completed with the 
assistance of a paid tax preparer. This interaction presents a unique opportunity for a professional with 
knowledge of the tax code to correct misunderstandings that lead to underreaction to tax incentives. A 
tax preparer can make nonsalient incentives salient; correct misperceptions or faulty, heuristic-based 
understandings of the tax code; and generally direct attention to available options for tax reduction 
paired with actionable advice on how to pursue those opportunities. To give a concrete example, we 
imagine paid tax preparers directly telling customers they have a balance due to the IRS, but that this 
balance could be immediately reduced with a payment to their favorite charity. Charities could partner 
with tax preparation services to make this type of transaction as quick and easy as possible. Interactions 
like these have been seen as a boon to the later deadline (Steuerle 2013),4 and the case is made more 
persuasive in light of the recent literature reviewed above. These interactions can harness all three 
psychological dimensions we have highlighted in this brief: they catch taxpayers at a rare moment when 
they are especially attentive to tax issues, remove biases about the strength of incentives for charitable 
donations, and present the option of charitable giving in a way where the immediate cost is offset by an 
immediate reward—the avoidance of aversive payments to the IRS. 
While we think these two channels offer significant possibilities for increasing charitable donation 
activity, two important caveats must be considered. First, while these psychological issues are relevant 
for many, we believe they are less likely to be of primary importance for the highest-income tax filers. 
While many filers might interact with tax or accounting professionals only when filing their annual 
return shortly before tax day, high-income individuals are more likely to remain in contact with their tax 
preparers throughout the year. In addition, existing work has shown that high-income filers are quite 
responsive to charitable-giving tax incentives in a manner that suggests the issues discussed here could 
be secondary to standard economic incentives (Bakija and Heim 2011).  
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Second, a move to the alternative deadline may affect the current interaction between the year-end 
deadline and the holiday season. End-of-year donations are of critical importance to the charitable 
sector. The Network for Good’s Online Giving Study found that 31 percent of 2014 annual giving 
occurred in December, with 12 percent occurring in the last three days of the year.5 This heavy 
concentration of giving is believed to be driven by a combination of deadline effects and religious 
motivation. The current deadline for charitable giving coincides with major holidays for several 
prominent religious groups, when religious imperatives to support the less fortunate are made salient to 
many Americans. To the extent that there is a complementarity between these religious norms and 
deadline-induced pressure for immediate donations, moving the deadline away from the holiday season 
might have some negative influence on this important period for charitable donation. While we suspect 
that the complementarity in question is not large enough to offset the significant salience-related 
benefits of the alternative deadline listed above, little quantitative evidence on that trade-off currently 
exists. We encourage further research along this particular line, which would help provide a full 
assessment of the net incentive effects of a deadline change.   
Conclusion 
In a 2015 executive order, President Barack Obama directed federal agencies to “use behavioral science 
insights to better serve the American people.” In light of recent research in behavioral public finance, we 
believe that changing the deadline for charitable giving to tax day provides an opportunity to better 
serve tax filers. While some countervailing forces require further study, the bulk of existing literature 
on tax salience suggests that the alternative deadline would increase the efficacy of this tax incentive. 
As consideration of potential deadline changes continues, we hope that both policymakers and 
researchers will devote attention to the complex psychology surrounding this seemingly simple 
decision. 
Notes 
1. Alternatively, a tax filer could forego the option to immediately claim that deduction and instead claim it on a 
2016 tax return the following year.  
2. Eugene Steuerle. “A New April 15,” The NonProfit Times, March 3, 2010, 
http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/a-new-april-15/.  
Eugene Steuerle. “An April 15 Deadline for Charitable Giving Would Be a Boon to Nonprofits,” The Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, December 8, 2014, https://philanthropy.com/article/An-April-15-Deadline-for/152105. 
3. Note that including additional provisions and schedules, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, can render the 
tax schedule nonconvex. Despite this caveat, the key comparison that marginal tax rates exceed average tax 
rates still holds for most taxpayers.  
4. See note 2. 
5. “Network for Good Digital Giving Index,” Network for Good, accessed March 24, 2016, 
http://www.networkforgood.com/digitalgivingindex/. 
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